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Abstract 
New Zealand has not yet experienced the type of pre-election coalition formations 
that have been practiced in some other parliamentary democracies. Yet, there have 
been occasions where individual parties have signalled their unambiguous 
preference for a coalition partner based on a desired electoral result. Some parties 
have also clearly stated that they will not form a coalition with a particular party or 
parties. It would be expected that pre-election signals could be safely relied upon 
to predict post-election arrangements. A selection of pre-election events, 
indicators, arrangements and manoeuvrings of the post-MMP elections have been 
chosen to demonstrate the impact each case study had upon government 
formations. The position taken by NZ First, in 1996, is contrasted with those taken 
by the Alliance and Labour parties. Important lessons were learnt, by both Labour 
and the Alliance, in time for the 1999 election and both parties engaged in a 
manner which saw them successfully form a new government. During the 2002 
and 2005 elections, most parties communicated strong messages indicating their 
most and their least preferred post-election partners. This paper is part of a wider 
PhD study on NZ coalitions that is being undertaken by the author. The case 
studies illustrate the difficulties faced by all parties in maintaining their individual 
identity and, at the same time, conveying an impression of cooperation and 
stability. The events outlined in this paper demonstrate that some form of pre-
election agreement or electoral coalition is increasingly been reached. The 
indications are that there is a high level MMP adaptation in the centre but the 
general voting public appears to have yet to learn to correctly identify the parties’ 
pre-election signals. It remains to be seen whether voters can correctly interpret 
whether parties pre-election stances transform into a post-election quick-step or 
perhaps a sly shuffle. 
 
Introduction 
It stands to reason that if politicians are motivated, into forming or terminating 
governments, by the perquisites of office or the ability to influence policy, then they 
might form electoral coalitions for similar reasons. These pre-election arrangements 
could also be construed to be part of an electoral strategy. Politicians would be 
                                            
1 Grant Gillon is currently a PhD student with Massey University, Albany. He was an Alliance list 
Member of Parliament during the 45th and 46th Parliaments (1996-2002). Some of these experiences 
have been reinforced from notes and official documents of the time. However, some of the 
observations have also been recalled from memory.  
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unlikely to announce their coalition intentions with another party if they predicted that 
such an arrangement would cost the party electoral support.  However, they might 
anticipate an increase in votes if the electorate approved of a particular potential 
coalition government. Such an increase in votes would provide extra post-election 
leverage with the coalition partner. The level of each party’s negotiating currency 
would vary according to the outcome of the election. 
 
Since the introduction of MMP in 1996, post-election outcomes have often produced 
as many surprises for the New Zealand public as the dynamics of the election 
struggles themselves. Political scientists attempting to predict likely coalition 
formations might assess a number of indicators. As well as policy dimension analysis, 
pre-election signals might be relied upon as safe guidelines to post-election 
arrangements. These signals would manifest themselves in many forms but the most 
reliable should be party leaders’ favourable or unfavourable comments about other 
parties and their leaders.  Although the Labour and Alliance parties expressed 
unambiguous preference during the 1999 election campaign, ambitions were not so 
transparent during the first MMP election held in 1996. The 2002 election saw Labour 
communicate a clear intention to include Jim Anderton in the next cabinet. This was 
in direct contrast to the Greens’ intransigence over genetically modified organism 
issue. The Greens strong stance ensured their self-exclusion from the future 
government. In sharp distinction to previous elections, the 2005 campaign included a 
series of almost theatrical episodes as some party leaders adopted strange tactics to 
convey their particular electoral desires to the wider public. New Zealand’s brief 
history of proportional representation indicates that such utterances made in the heat 
of a campaign have not always been accurate indicators of post-election positions. 
Parties will often seek to convey messages about possible coalitions that they think 
will be in their best electoral interests. 
 
Theoretical Discussion 
Three main motivating categories have been advanced to enhance the accuracy of 
predicting the types of coalition that might form: office-seeking, policy-seeking, and 
vote-seeking.  Politicians possessed not just office-seeking motives but also desired to 
achieve policy wins (de Swaan, 1973; Laver & Budge, 1992; Laver & Schofield, 
1990; Strom & Muller, 1999). In fact, policy positions might be expected to form the 
very basis of difference (and cohesion) between political parties. 
Policy positions are one of the many tools that politicians used to increase votes and 
win elections. Vote-seeking is instrumental because votes themselves do not possess 
any intrinsic value (Downs, 1957, p. 28; Strom & Muller, 1999). The value of a vote 
lies in its use as a form of currency to obtain either office or policy objectives or both. 
Politicians need to maximise votes to achieve their goals. The more votes that a party 
wins the more negotiating power it possesses.  Therefore, politicians would have to 
consider the impact of any pre-election communication on their potential vote. 
 
Bale, Boston and Church (2005), considered that formal models of government 
formation failed to foretell coalitions “in the real world”. Instead, Bale et al., (2005) 
used the theory of path dependency when assessing the formation of the 1999 Labour/ 
Alliance coalition government. Bale et al., (2005) concluded that pre-election pacts 
are “relatively good indicators” of subsequent government formation. The more 
resources parties invested in the pre-election process, the greater the incentive to 
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ensure that the agreement worked. It can be assumed that pre-election agreements are 
accurate predictors of government formation.  
 
Sona Golder (2006) developed several hypotheses that are useful to assist in 
determining the effect of electoral coalitions. Golder identified varying types of 
coalition agreements or pacts. These pre-election arrangements ranged from highly 
formalised accords to loose arrangements. Such covenants might include non-
aggression deals and announcements of post-election working arrangements.   
 
Golder (2005) devised a definition of electoral coalitions as “a collection of parties 
that do not compete independently in an election either because they publicly agree to 
coordinate their campaigns, run joint candidates or joint lists, or govern together 
following the election”.  Golder (2005) qualified this definition by employing two 
criteria that were “both objective and observable”.  
 
The first criterion was that the arrangements must be stated publicly. This aspect was 
considered to be important because one of the main imperatives for forming pre-
election coalitions was to influence voter behaviour. The second criterion was that 
members of a pre-election agreement were prevented from campaigning as 
independent identities. Golder included in this category those parties that had quite 
loose election strategies recognising that election strategies can appear in a number of 
different guises. For example, parties that announced an intention to form a coalition 
after the election were deemed to have agreed to a joint election strategy. The position 
of the Alliance and Labour in 1999 could be included in this definition. Although both 
parties campaigned separately there was a non-aggression pact as well as agreement 
on post-election arrangements. Golder (2005) also included those intentions that were 
announced by only one partner but were not endorsed or rejected by the other party. 
Two common links were identified between the different forms of pre-election 
arrangements. The first was that parties “never compete in elections as truly 
independent entities. The second is that “the coordination of party strategies is made 
public” (Golder, 2005).  
 
 Golder’s definition has been used in the case studies, to assess whether pre-coalition 
announcements are interpreted as electoral coalitions.  The public expectation can 
affect the way electors cast their vote in both that and subsequent elections.  
Therefore, all types of signalling comments by party leaders, as well as pacts and 
agreements need to be included for the purposes of assessing the reliability of 
predicting post-election positions. The case studies indicate that the public did 
interpret intention from party leaders’ statements about their coalition intentions.  
 
Politicians that have made public declarations about desired coalition partners are also 
apt to condemn or state very clearly, those parties with which they reject.  However, 
there were no pre-election pacts prior to the 1999 general election. The 1996 coalition 
between National and NZ First could not have been predicted using path dependency 
theories; a point readily acknowledged by Bale et al., (2005). While research indicates 
that pre-coalition announcements and arrangements have a positive influence on the 
post-election government formation potential, it is not so clear about the less formal 
but nonetheless equally deliberate public utterances.  
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Voters in a proportional electoral system are increasingly choosing a government 
composition rather than a single party (Aimer & Vowles, 2004). Path dependency 
theory is a useful tool for assessing how pre-electoral accommodations and 
discussions translate into post-election arrangements (Bale et al., 2005). Similarly, 
Muller and Strom’s (1999) arguments, centred on motives for forming inter-party 
arrangements and provide an acceptable theoretical base for analysing why such 
events occurred.  However, neither theory fully tests the veracity of the signals party 
leaders might send to the electorate.  
 
Electoral Coalitions as Signalling Devices 
Golder (2005) identified three main reasons why pre-election arrangements are treated 
as signalling devises: (i) to signal the ability and willingness to form an effective 
government coalition, (ii) to signal the actual identity of a potential government as 
transparently as possible, and (iii) to signal the relevant parties’ desires to party 
members and voters to enable them to have a greater role in government rather than 
just preferred party selection (Golder, 2005).  
 
It has been more common to signal the identity of potential coalition governments. 
The intention of signalling was to accurately and unambiguously identify post-
election governments to voters. Risk-averse voters can then cast their ballot in the 
knowledge that they are helping to select a government rather than wait until after the 
election for a risky formation process to conclude (Golder, 2005).  
 
Golder’s (2005) final component of the signalling argument was that party leaders 
encouraged voters to have a greater say in the composition of the government.  If 
voters were unaware of potential coalition partners and only voted for individual 
parties, then they left the formation process entirely in the hands of the parties. In 
these cases, the resultant government became a complete lottery as far as the voter 
was concerned. Signalling of potential coalition partners has been one way of 
assisting voters to ‘own’ the election outcome.  
 
The value to parties of pre-election coalitions lies in the potential to gain a greater 
share of the votes. The value to voters of announcing pre-election arrangements lay in 
the reliability that such signalling, if successful, translated into a post-election 
government. If such a signalled government is not formed then it is reasonable to 
assume that the particular parties would lose the trust of the electorate. In other words, 
people would be unlikely to cast a future vote for parties that mislead the public (Bale 
et al., 2005; Golder, 2005).  
 
The Methods Used 
This research triangulated three different methods in this study: semi-structured 
interviews, primary document content analysis and participant observation. These 
three methods were particularly suited to the research as they provided a means of 
extracting rich data from an otherwise ‘closed world’ of the political system. The 
purpose of using the three research methods was to provide for sophisticated rigor. 
 
An analysis was carried out on primary documents including recorded information 
that is available from the 45th, 46th, 47th and 48th Parliaments. These papers related to 
the key political actors of the period, decisions made and processes followed or 
amended as well as speeches and media releases.  
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Key informants were vital contributors to this research. These particular respondents 
were needed to gain unique perspectives of phenomena that I was not able to observe 
as a participant. The key informants included MPs, officials and party officers who 
possessed knowledge about those party systems and sub-systems that I was unable to 
access. As such, their insights were important to assist me in gaining a full 
understanding of events as well as helping to validate other findings.  
 
The 1996 NZ First/National Government  
The 1996 National/NZ First government formation was controversial. The general 
expectation was that NZ First would form a coalition with Labour (J. Vowles, Aimer, 
Banducci, & Karp, 1998). However, the coalition agreement was signed with the 
National Party after two months of NZ First negotiators haggling between National 
and Labour spokespeople. The formation process was greeted with dismay by many, 
particularly because of the pre-election stance taken by NZ First leader, Winston 
Peters and other of his party’s MPs. Voters’ apprehensions were triggered both by 
their expectations as well as their preferences. 
 
It appears that Winston Peters embarked on classic vote-seeking behaviour as outlined 
by Muller and Strom (1999). Peters, mindful of National’s increasing unpopularity, 
deliberately raised the electorate’s expectations that NZ First would support forming a 
coalition with Labour rather than National. These hopes were at least partly created as 
a result of Peters’ speeches and behaviour. For some time, Peters had been attacking 
National’s record and lambasting New Zealand corporate business community (Kerr, 
1998; New Zealand Parliament, 1996a; J. Vowles et al., 1998). Just prior to the 1996 
election (20 August), Peters attacked National as being traitors. He went further and 
stated in Parliament that the National Party Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, should not 
even bother to phone Peters after the election as he was “not fit for the job” and would 
be “out” (New Zealand Parliament, 1996b). 
 
 
Peters and his deputy continued to pour scorn on both the major parties but refused to 
confirm his preferred coalition partner and many of his actions created confusion in 
the voters’ minds. Peters appeared to express greater vitriol towards National than 
Labour, calling National and its stated potential coalition partners, ACT and the 
Christian Coalition, "the toxic trio" (Laugesen, 1996). Furthermore, Peters stated that 
"There's only one party that can bust National this election and you're looking at it," 
(Laugesen, 1996). Writer, Bruce Jesson (1997) reported on a NZ First meeting that he 
attended where Winston Peters “stated categorically that there would be no coalition 
with National”. The comment was later denied by Peters when it was raised during a 
television interview.  
 
The end result of these public utterings by Peters was an expectation of a Labour-NZ 
First coalition after election night 1996. Following the election, Peters told his 
supporters that it was a time for cool heads, patience and leadership, not a time for 
settling old scores (Burdon, 1996). Such comments indicate that Peters had an inkling 
that he might have to deal with the National Party. While Winston Peters might have 
been playing both of the major parties off against each other with “practised 
deftness”, most observers seemed to consider that he had publicly indicated that the 
Labour Party was his preferred option (J. Vowles et al., 1998, p. 121).  A poll of 
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voters’ coalition preferences showed that NZ First’s supporters were dismissive of a 
National-NZ First coalition (J. Vowles et al., 1998). The resulting decision of NZ First 
to form a government with National left many NZ First members with a feeling of 
betrayal and undermined public confidence in the new government (Miller, 1998).  
 
NZ First was the only small party to rise in the polls closer to the election. Most of the 
NZ First support seemed to come from Labour’s three point slide. Labour leader 
Helen Clark beat off a leadership challenge in late May. The attempted coup might 
have been sparked by Labour’s poor performance and helped NZ First increase its 
lead in the next NBR poll to 30 percent (Hunt, 1996b; Small, 1996).  Peters’ polling 
was also attributed to a number of populist stances and policies that were in direct 
opposition to National’s policies (Hunt, 1996b).  NZ First’s polls peaked in May and 
started to decline in late June and continued into the election period (Hunt, 1996a, 
1996c). However, the dramatic poll rise indicated, amongst other things, a major level 
of support for a party that opposed the National Party’s policy direction. 
 
Polling also indicated a “clear preference for a coalition involving Labour” (J. Vowles 
et al., 1998). Forty-four percent of NZ First voters preferred a Labour-NZ First or a 
Labour-NZ First -Alliance coalition (J. Vowles et al., 1998). Only 13 percent of NZ 
First voters wanted a coalition with National. The Vowles’ survey results showed that 
there was a wide expectation and desire both before and after the election that Labour 
would be the senior partner in any coalition. At the same time, few National voters 
wanted a National-NZ First coalition government (J. Vowles et al., 1998).  
 
As the election approached Winston Peters was questioned more and more about his 
preferred coalition partner. The protest vote switched to serious consideration of NZ 
First as a major player in government once the party increased its poll to second place.  
Peters was equivocal and conveyed mixed messages. The electorate became 
distrustful and wary as National supporters became suspicious that Peters preferred 
Labour. Labour voters were also nervous that Peters would coalesce with National 
and NZ First support ebbed away to such an extent that the party fell to third place by 
election night. Nonetheless, NZ First’s electoral achievement was considerable having 
risen in only three years from nothing to a major party in New Zealand’s Parliament. 
 
Many voters felt betrayed after the formation process of 1996 when, against public 
expectations, NZ First formed a coalition government with National (J. Vowles et al., 
1998, p. 121; Wilson, 2002).  In contrast, the Alliance was particularly keen to ensure 
that voters knew that their preferred coalition partner was the Labour Party (The 
Alliance, 1996, p.4). A major aspect of this position was to encourage voters to cast 
their ballot in favour of a government rather than a party. 
 
The Alliance and Labour Parties in 1996 
Where NZ First was evasive about its preferred coalition partner the Alliance was 
emphatic. Prior to the 1996 election, Alliance leader Jim Anderton made several 
overtures to Labour but these were spurned by Helen Clark. Clark found some of the 
Alliance’s policy demands too restricting. As a result, Labour and the Alliance were 
unable to reach any agreement by Election Day 1996, a situation that hindered their 
chances of forming the next government. 
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The Alliance party recognised that when in government, it would need to cooperate 
with other parties in order to pass legislation (The Alliance, 1996). Mindful of the 
sense of policy betrayal felt by voters over previous Labour and National 
governments, the Alliance considered that any policy compromises should be 
transparent to the electorate (Bunkle, 1994; The Alliance, 1996; J. Vowles et al., 
1998). The Alliance (1996, p.4) considered that “any policy agreement be announced 
to the voters before the election” and that “potential coalition partners also be 
announced to the public”. The Alliance (1996, p.4) announced its own coalition 
direction stating that it would “...not support a National Party Government”.  As well 
as announcing its coalition bottom-line, the Alliance also specified its policy bottom-
lines. 
 
Labour firmly rejected several advances made by the Alliance (Hunt, 1995). The 
Alliance leader, Jim Anderton was reported as approaching Labour three or four times 
for coalition talks but “the Labour Party has said to get lost until after the election” 
(Hunt, 1995).  Clark was reported as predicting that there would be talks between 
Labour and the Alliance but there would not be an agreement before the election 
(Waikato Times, 1994). Helen Clark also considered the Alliance’s policy stance was 
designed to deliberately keep it out of coalition “so that it could retain its purist 
minority status” (Riddell, 1994). Whatever the reasons, the inability of the parties to 
reach an agreement precluded the possibility of a centre-left government until the 
1999 election.  
 
In an attempt to initiate coalition talks, Anderton softened his non-negotiable policy 
stance2. The leader of the Alliance announced that the two parties could agree to 
disagree on fundamental policy points. The Alliance still wished to retain the right to 
speak out on issues if it was out-voted by a larger coalition partner (Laugesen, 1995a). 
Anderton continued to press Labour for coalition discussions prior to the election.  
Helen Clark continued to reject Anderton’s calls right up until the election saying at 
one point that “he has a viper up his sleeve” (Laugesen, 1995b).  Clark took this 
position despite a large proportion of Labour voters preferring a Labour-Alliance 
coalition (J. Vowles et al., 1998). 
 
Anderton maintained that his purpose was to try and deliver something to the 
Alliance’s supporters and the policy stance was not a coalition negotiating tactic 
(Anderton, 2005). The public had voted for an MMP system partly because they felt 
betrayed by previous Labour and National governments. Voters desired consensus 
politics and considered possible coalition combinations, but seemed to reject any 
hardline stances. The Alliance’s position was rejected by both Labour and the voters.  
 
The Labour/Alliance Dance of 1999. 
The experiences of the 1996 general election helped shaped political attitudes for the 
1999 election. Hard political lessons on coalition negotiations had been learnt by both 
Labour and the Alliance in time for the 1999 election. An Alliance post-1996 election 
review concluded that the Alliance had “badly misjudged their stance on the 
coalition” and had “marginalised itself from government” (Alliance Election Review 
Committee, 1997, p. 14). The committee recommended that a public virtue be made 
                                            
2 NZ First did not learn from the Alliance’s experience in 1996 and leading up to the 1999 election 
Winston Peters announced a “non-negotiable bottom line” of four policies (Peters, 12 May 1999,).  
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of the Alliance’s stance on coalitions and to continue to explore partnership 
opportunities in the lead up to the next election. Further, a decision was made to 
reposition the Alliance in such a way that it could exert significant influence on and 
be part of a coalition government (Alliance Election Review Committee, 1997, p. 24-
5). Both the Labour and the Alliance parties met, held discussions, and signalled their 
coalition intentions well before the 1999 election. Helen Clark was invited to and 
attended the Alliance’s annual conference held in Auckland, in 1998. Anderton had a 
very clear view to play a role in government (Anderton, 2005). The Alliance’s strong 
policy-seeking behaviour was modified so as to attract votes and gain office. 
 
While Labour and the Alliance did not enter into bilateral arrangements, there were 
clear policy modifications on both sides to make them more acceptable to each other 
(Jonathan Boston & Church, 2000). The Alliance dropped its twelve point non-
negotiable policies and adopted a more conciliatory stance with Labour (Anderton, 
2005). 
 
Both Labour and the Alliance were dismayed they had missed out on government in 
1993 and that disappointment was compounded by the events of 1996. The events of 
1996 incentivised the parties to develop relationships with potential coalition partners. 
It was apparent from experiences of the 1996-99 Parliament that it was unlikely that 
one party was going to govern alone. The government benches and their supporting 
parties were in disarray and  Labour and the Alliance decided to exploit this disorder 
(Miller, 2002). 
 
One in two Labour voters preferred a coalition government, and by the 10th November 
1999 support had peaked at nearly 35 percent for a Labour-Alliance coalition (Miller, 
2002). Labour and the Alliance entered into a cooperative arrangement and presented 
“a more united front” to the public (Jonathan Boston & Church, 2000, p. 233). 
Regular informal meetings were held between senior members of both parties who 
adopted a more conciliatory approach in the House leading up to the 1999 election. 
MPs in the House discussed strategy and there were regular meetings, between key 
advisers to Helen Clark and Jim Anderton, to develop understandings that would 
guide the transitional process.  Although, the parties did not sign formal agreements 
they made a commitment to implicit understandings (Jonathan Boston & Church, 
2000, p. 233). 
 
The parties developed broad understandings of managing the pre-election and 
immediate post-election period. There were four main areas that focussed more on 
process rather than policy. Parties were to avoid personal criticism including attacks 
on each other’s political record or policy positions.  A no-surprises policy was agreed 
to as well as a commitment to close communication on policy announcements. 
Finally, a timetable was to be developed for government formation and post-election 
negotiations and coalition management. Part of this arrangement was an agreement 
that no other party would be part of the coalition deal without “prior consultation and 
mutual agreement” (Jonathan Boston & Church, 2000, p. 235).  Post-election 
ministerial positions would be allocated according to general proportionality 
principles. The parties also recognised that each had the ability to campaign separately 
on policy platforms but they agreed to avoid promoting policy positions that were so 
different that they created tensions.  The arrangements were an example of an 
electoral accommodation as defined by Golder (2005). 
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There was early recognition by Labour and Alliance strategists that their respective 
election campaigns had the potential to harm the other party. Any damage would risk 
handing the election to the Opposition. Unlike other parties, Labour and the Alliance 
decided against any electorate accommodations.3 . However, an agreement was 
reached on campaign strategy. Labour asked that the Alliance not campaign on an 
exact formula for splitting the vote. Any other tactic to secure the party vote was 
perfectly acceptable. But, it was considered misleading to try to convince Labour 
voters that splitting their vote was the only way to guarantee a coalition. In return, the 
Alliance’s advisor asked that Labour not campaign with the slogan that ‘the only way 
to get rid of National was to cast both votes for Labour’. Agreement was reached. 
Further, part of the ‘understandings’ was that if there was a breach the 'victim' would 
try to ensure that there was no immediate retaliation. This was specifically designed to 
stop an escalation of reprisals that would electorally damage both parties by showing 
that they could not solve their problems - especially between the leaders. 
 
Labour surprised the Alliance in the last few days of the campaign by suddenly 
campaigning very strongly on the slogan "the only way to defeat National is to 
double-vote Labour". Senior Alliance members considered Labour’s tactics as 
specifically damaging to the Alliance, as well as being in breach of what was thought 
to be an 'understanding'. The Alliance attributed their subsequent poll drops from 
about 12 percent to about 8 percent (and Labour’s rising polls) to Labour’s actions in 
the last few days before the election (Jack Vowles, 2002).4 Both parties’ actions 
exhibited strong office-seeking behaviour. Labour campaigned for single-party 
majority status and the Alliance lost votes but attained the government benches. 
However, the lack of trust was to haunt the coalition government and eventually 
contribute to the break-up of the Alliance and an early election in 2002. 
 
Labour/Progressive Coalition Minority Government 
When the Prime Minister announced an early election polls indicated that Labour 
could win a majority single party government (Church, 2003; J Vowles, 2004). Helen 
Clark called the election on June 11th 2002, four months earlier than anticipated.  By 
June 23rd Labour’s support briefly ducked below the 50 per cent line and subsequently 
recovered to touch almost 55 per cent by July 1st. However, a number of damaging 
events including ‘paintergate’ and ‘corngate’ caused Labour’s polling to steadily 
decline.5 There was a last minute partial recovery to 41.3 per cent on election day (J 
Vowles, 2004).6  The initial polls contributed to Labour developing a high level of 
confidence over the potential election-day results. The subsequent lower polling and 
damaging publicity were factors that encouraged Labour strategists to adopt 
aggressive positions towards the Green and NZ First parties. 
                                            
3 Closer to the election, Alliance candidate Phillida Bunkle did withdraw from the Wellington Central 
race, leaving the seat to a straight contest between Act NZ and Labour. 
4 I have checked my understanding of this sequence of events with Jim Anderton’s former Chief of 
Staff, Andrew Ladley who was responsible for formulating the original understandings, and for advice 
on this particular event, and he had no objections to it. 
5 Clark was accused of fraudulently signing a painting that had been placed in a charity auction. 
National leader, Bill English severely criticised her on 7 July after a police report was made public. In a 
second incident Clark and her government were accused of a cover-up over the inadvertent release of 
genetically modified seeds. This issue was aired on TV3 on 10th July followed the next day by a book 
release on the issue.  
6 Election Day was 27th July 2002. Labour’s party vote was 38.7 per cent. 
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Soon after Parliament had risen for the election, Helen Clark indicated that she would 
welcome the Progressives as coalition partners. The Progressives had requested that 
Clark make it clear that former Alliance leader Jim Anderton would be back in 
cabinet, regardless of the election outcome.7 The announcement conveyed a message 
of continuity and respect for a valued coalition relationship, rather than Labour saying 
it wanted total parliamentary domination. Clark agreed and indeed all the rest of the 
parties’ 'understandings' played out as arranged (NZPA, 2002a) 
 
But Clark would not confirm Jim Anderton back in his role as Deputy Prime Minister 
saying that it would “depend on the strength of his party” (Luke, 2002; Waikato 
Times, 2002). Clark went further to declare repeatedly that the Progressives were the 
only party that she wished to include in any coalition after the election (J Boston & 
Church, 2003; Waikato Times, 2002).  If the two parties could not form a majority 
government, Clark preferred a supporting arrangement with other parties as necessary.  
 
The costs to Labour of a coalition deal with the Progressives were minor. Jim 
Anderton was keen to continue in the demanding role of Minister of Economic and 
Regional Development. The addition of the Progressives to a Labour Cabinet, even if 
the arithmetic showed that they were surplus to a majority, indicated a willingness to 
operate in the MMP environment of constructive cooperation and stability. This 
aspect was increasingly important given both Anderton’s conflict with his former 
Alliance party members and Clark’s conflict with the Greens.  
 
A bitter rift developed between the Labour MPs and the Green Party over a 
genetically modified organism policy (GMOs). The Greens made a number of public 
statements threatening not to support a Labour-led government after the election if the 
impending government lifted a moratorium on GMOs (Fitzsimons, 2002a, 2002b; 
Mold, 2001).   
 
However, the Greens soon recognised that their stubbornness was costing them votes. 
The Greens ‘clarified’ their position only a week out from the election. Green Co-
leader Rod Donald announced that the Greens were willing to support a Labour-led 
government outside of a coalition and give them “confidence” (Wilson, 2002). This 
confidence would only last until the decision was made on the GMO moratorium (due 
in October 2003). In turn, Clark’s position appeared to become increasingly 
accommodating towards the Greens.  
 
Clark seemed to anticipate the inevitability of having to develop relationships with 
parties that might support an increasingly likely minority government. Although, 
Labour ran an anti-Greens advertising campaign in the last week of the campaign 
Clark advised National Radio that she would look to the Greens for support (NZPA, 
2002b).  While Labour’s attitude towards the Greens softened, there was no thawing 
in the relationship with NZ First. Peters’ party remained unpopular with the voters 
and any deal was likely to cost Labour electoral support. 
 
                                            
7 The Progressive Coalition was formed from the members of the Alliance that stayed with Jim 
Anderton upon the Alliance’s break-up. The Progressive Coalition later became known as the 
‘Progressives’ for Parliamentary purposes. 
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Early on in the campaign, Clark identified two other issues that caused Labour to 
dismiss NZ First as a likely coalition partner: NZ First’s immigration policy and 
Labour’s experience in trying to negotiate a deal with Peters after the 1996 election 
(Peters, 2002). However, NZ First’s polls lifted in the last week of the campaign 
assisted by Labour’s attacks on the Greens (Johansson, 2003; J Vowles, 2004). The 
polling increases of both NZ First and Peter Dunne’s United party led commentators 
to speculate on the possibility of a “Grand Coalition“ of “National, NZ First, United 
and Act” (Venter, 2002). Polling also indicated that more NZ First’s supporters 
preferred the party to enter into a coalition with National rather than with Labour 
(Small, 2002). The “Grand Coalition“ idea was firmly rejected by Peters and Act’s 
leader Richard Prebble (NZPA, 2002d; Tunnah, 2002).  Clark also waded into the 
debate after being silent for a few days and firmly rejected Peters as a possible 
coalition partner (Small, 2002).  
 
Although, Clark still had one eye on a majority coalition government she also 
considered the possibility of a minority government from a week out from election-
day. Labour and the Green Party started to slip in the polls. But the fortunes of 
another minor party, Peter Dunne’s United Future were climbing (J Vowles, 2004). 
Clark expressed a willingness to consider Dunne as a coalition partner. In turn, Dunne 
communicated a readiness to support a Labour minority government (Mold & 
Armstrong, 2002; Venter, 2002). 
 
However, the new relationship between Labour and Dunne almost immediately 
started to wobble. Labour MPs were publicly split over their ability to work with 
United Future (Browne, 2002). The Greens also raised concerns about a Labour-
United Future coalition. Fitzsimons thought that given Dunne’s voting record and lack 
of policy bottom-lines, people may as well just vote for Labour (NZPA, 2002c). In 
response, Dunne maintained that he had not ruled out working with National. Dunne 
advised people to wait and see what the election results were and depending on the 
final figures could talk to either National’s English or Labour’s Clark (NZPA, 2002c).  
The final arrangement saw a formal minority coalition between Labour and the 
Progressives. United Future, whose policy dimension was further from Labour’s than 
the Green’s, provided a confidence and supply agreement to the government in 
exchange for some policy wins. The government entered into a unique ‘cooperation 
agreement’ with the Greens. The Green party provided the necessary votes on some 
key policy areas that United Future did not support. Later, the coalition government 
had to rely on NZ First to enact the Foreshore and Seabed Bill when it could not gain 
support from either the Greens or United Future. Although the combination of support 
agreements necessitated numerous complex negotiations and extra liaising on House 
processes it enabled the government to continue full term.   
 
2005 Election 
The Green Party became more office-seeking in the lead-up to the 2005 election. 
Although the Greens held strongly to their position over the GM moratorium they 
grew tired of playing a support role and some members looked forward to holding 
ministerial portfolios (Taylor, 2003). Green Co-leader Rod Donald considered that 
having only one minister in government “wouldn't be enough. We would want two," 
(Butler, 2005). But, after their conflict with Labour over the GM issue, they needed to 
signal their coalition aspirations to the public early on in the 2002-2005 Parliament. 
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The Greens started the process of convincing the public that despite their differences 
with Labour they were capable of working together. The Greens were also convinced 
that Labour in turn wanted to show that the two parties could co-operate and “in 
particular were capable of working in coalition on some thing” (Donald, 2004).   
 
The Green Party started thinking ahead to the next election and they wanted to 
demonstrate an ability to work with Labour. “The political reality was and still is that 
Labour is the only party that we could form in government with” (Donald, 2004).  
Labour’s position had also softened. Helen Clark sent strong signals to voters that she 
was able to work with the Greens. Closer to election-day, Clark invited Fitzsimons to 
campaign with her for a day on transport issues. However, these moves sent ripples 
through other parties. 
 
Both United and NZ First expressed strong concern about the possibility of Green 
MPs being in Cabinet.  United Party’s, Peter Dunne also reiterated the point that his 
party remained “committed to talking first to the largest party after the election’ 
(Dunne, 2005).  As if to reinforce the point, Dunne engaged in a public show of 
meeting with National’s new leader, Don Brash. The meeting was reported to be a 
discussion on the possibility of post-election cooperation (Radio New Zealand 
Newswire, 2005). A theatrical incident occurred as a prelude to this meeting. Act’s 
leader, Rodney Hide had appeared desperate to meet with Brash to gain public 
support for a coalition between their two parties. Brash had avoided the meeting until 
he unexpectedly “bumped into” Hide on Lambton Quay, Wellington. There was 
media speculation that Hide had devised the accidental meet (McLoughlin, 2005). In 
an effort to avoid a repetition of the Lambton Quay meeting, Dunne and Brash went 
to extraordinary lengths to keep their meeting a secret. They even had to change the 
venue when Rodney Hide was spotted close to the planned meeting place (New 
Zealand Herald, 2005a). It was rumoured that Dunne would meet with Clark over 
similar issues but that arrangement never eventuated (Martin, 2005). United Future’s 
Peter Dunne made it clear that his party would not support a Labour-Greens coalition 
(Dunne, 2005).  
 
NZ First’s leader, Peters sent signals to voters that he had “no preference” between 
National or Labour (Peters, 2005c). Peters maintained that “If the electorate clearly 
chooses one of these (National or Labour) over the other - we will accept this” 
(Peters, 2005c).  Peters tried to take a middle course in an attempt to avoid the traps of 
1996 when he was accused of misleading voters (Donald, 2005a). This might have 
been in response to a Herald DigiPoll that showed NZ First supporters almost evenly 
split in their coalition partner preference between Labour or National (New Zealand 
Herald, 2005b).  In doing so he sent confusing signals to voters resulting in further 
attempts at clarification (Peters, 2005a, 2005b). What NZ First did make clear was 
that they would not support or join a coalition government that included any members 
of the Green party (Donald, 2005b; Peters, 2005c). 
 
There are several events where dramatic poll fortunes of parties paralleled electoral 
announcements. The Green Party’s percentage rating in the Herald DigiPoll doubled 
(3.2 per cent to 6.4 per cent) overtaking NZ First soon after Clark and Fitzsimons 
spent a day campaigning together (New Zealand Herald, 2005d). Likewise, a public 
display of camaraderie appears to have assisted United Future’s fortunes. Dunne’s 
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party’s polls rose 1.9 per cent to 2.6 per cent in the days following his coffee break 
with Don Brash on the 6th September (New Zealand Herald, 2005c). At the same point 
Act’s fortunes dropped by a third to 1.3 per cent after Brash announced that he was 
not going to do any deals with Hide over the Epsom electorate (New Zealand Herald, 
2005c; Watkins, 2005). Clark’s comments advising that the Maori party “would be 
the last cab off the rank” are also close to the dropping of Maori Party polls (TV One, 
2005). Perhaps the most compelling change was that which could be associated with 
announcements made by both Peters and Dunne. 
 
Both Peters and Dunne made two main announcements concerning their post-
coalition ‘bottom-lines’: they would not support a government that included the 
Greens; and they would support the largest party on election night. The 
announcements received a large amount of publicity and generated extensive debate. 
It is reasonable to assume that their positioning caused electors to cast both votes for 
the two main parties. The NZ First, United and the Green parties all slumped in the 
polls in the last few days of the campaign. The electorate seemed to line up along the 
traditional left/right lines. Voters who had previously considered it safe to cast a vote 
for a minor partner in a coalition government changed their mind. Electors seemed 
afraid that their support for a minor party would inadvertently allow their least desired 
choice to form a government.  
 
After the election, an ‘inner coalition’ was formed between Labour and the 
Progressives. The government formation processes excluded the Greens from the 
coalition but they signed a cooperation agreement with the Labour-Progressive 
government. Formal confidence and supply agreements were signed by the 
government with both the United and NZ First parties. In an unusual move, Peters and 
Dunne accepted ministerial positions outside Cabinet. 
 
The actions of Dunne and Peters were clearly designed to attract votes from both 
other minor party supporters but in the end frightened voters into either National or 
Labour camps. NZ First and United also recognised in voters an underlying concern 
about the Greens entering government and campaigned on that fact.  Hide attempted 
to portray himself as a partner for National in an attempt to attract votes from the 
larger party. Something Brash recognised this and resisted Hide’s overtures forcing 
Hide to campaign strongly for an electorate seat. The 2005 election undoubtedly 
exhibited strong vote-seeking behaviour from most parties and electoral signalling 
played a strong role in the campaign strategies. 
 
Conclusion 
The four election events highlight a unique situation of considerable competition for 
votes between the potential coalition partners. Formal coalition theories proved useful 
in assessing the motives of politicians during this time. Poll data gathered during all 
four elections indicated a close fit between potential partnership statements and 
changing public support. Anticipated increases in electoral support provided 
incentives for party leaders to make pre-election statements about their post-election 
intentions.  
 
NZ First embarked on vote-seeking behaviour in 1996 in order to win policy and 
office. During the same time the Alliance remained focused on policy rather than 
votes while its only potential coalition partner, Labour exhibited office-seeking 
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behaviour. These contradictory positions helped to ensure that neither party was able 
to enter government in 1996. The approaches taken by both NZ First and the Alliance 
in the lead-up to the 1996 election were both flawed. NZ First had taken great care not 
to choose their potential partner, but this strategy resulted in a confused public. The 
Alliance on the other hand was very open in courting Labour, and only Labour, as 
their potential coalition partner. This approach seemed to spook Labour into fearing a 
loss of voting support. In contrast, the public positions of both the Alliance and 
Labour signalled to voters that the two parties could not form a viable alternative 
government. The electorate had clearly signalled their preference for a Labour-NZ 
First coalition. After the election the voters felt they had been betrayed by politicians 
yet again. The public believing that they had been misled by NZ First in 1996 
punished them in 1999.  
 
Political parties had not been clear about their electoral strategies and failed to 
accurately convey their intentions to the public. The key lesson for Labour and the 
Alliance from 1996 was that in the chaos and emotion of the run-up to the election, 
the greater goal of government had to be kept in mind. Otherwise, obvious division 
would lead to continued periods in opposition. This lesson had been learnt by the time 
of the 1999 election. Both Labour and the Alliance modified their strong policy 
seeking behaviour, in 1999, in order to gain enough votes to enter office. The result 
was that the voters identified a potential stable and viable coalition to replace the 
instability of the previous three years.  
 
Similarly, the Greens recognising that a hard policy position of GMOs lost them votes 
in 2002 sought to relax their stand in an effort to win back votes and gain office. Their 
efforts were unsuccessful. The public, wary of returning a majority Labour 
government, chose United Future as a partner in the place of the intransigent Greens. 
 
During the 2005 election, NZ First and United campaigned to increase their vote 
share. Both parties opposed a coalition that included the Greens. In 2005, most parties 
contrived public events at which they could declare their seemingly undying devotion 
to one partner or another. Labour’s Clark recognised public unrest of Treaty of 
Waitangi issues and declared that the Maori Party would not be part of her 
government. The voters selected a parliamentary composition based on the party 
leaders’ announcements. Labour, desirous of retaining the treasury benches, also 
heeded those signals and this decision was reflected in the resulting government.  
 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the research. The first is that party leaders 
considered that pre-election strategies sometimes provided electoral advantage. Some 
leaders, such as Winston Peters and Peter Dunne, have consistently refused to 
publicly align their parties with any other single party.  Other party leaders, such as 
Labour and the Alliance, saw advantage in directly informing the electorate their 
desired coalition partners. Parties also relaxed or hardened earlier positions and 
statements depending on the polls and ambitions for office. As Muller and Strom 
predicted party leaders acted in what they considered to be their best interests. All 
strategies were anticipated to provide the respective parties with an increased share of 
the votes. 
 
 14
Secondly, the same motivations applied to government formation can be applied to 
electoral coalitions. Politicians view office as the pathway to policy gains. The more 
votes a party wins then the higher the chances of gaining ministerial portfolios thereby 
achieving policy wins. Party leaders clearly considered that their stated coalition 
position would provide an increase in votes. This increased electoral share, in the NZ 
proportional system directly transfers into legislative currency.  
 
Thirdly, as New Zealand’s political parties and voters became more familiar with the 
proportional voting system they became more adept at transmitting and receiving 
accurate pre-election signals.  
 
Parties no longer hesitate to provide public indications of their preferred coalition 
partner. This is in stark contrast to the experiences of pre-1996 when the Alliance’s 
attempt at electoral coalition was rejected by Labour. During the 2005 general 
election, parties openly sought association with other groupings as an electoral 
strategy. Further, preliminary research indicates that heightened public expectations 
have encouraged parties to more accurately communicate their post-coalition 
intentions as electoral coalition signals. The public’s reading of the electoral signals 
increased in accuracy with each election. This improvement in understanding might 
parallel a greater understanding of the machinations of MMP itself. Understanding 
politician’s motivations in adopting a particular pre-election stance is now essential to 
assist the prediction of post-election government formations. Further, such 
understandings contribute towards the transparency of government formation. 
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